The paper surveys more than forty characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation and contains one new result. A general scoring operator is self-consistent if alternative i is assigned a greater score than j whenever i gets no worse (better) results of comparisons and its 'opponents' are assigned respectively greater (no smaller) scores than those of j. We prove that self-consistency is satisfied if and only if the application of a scoring operator reduces to the solution of a homogeneous system of algebraic equations with a monotone function on the left-hand side.
Introduction
Scoring procedures transform profiles of individual preferences over a set of alternatives into scores of the alternatives. The scores can be used in themselves or serve as the basis for ranking or choice. For the present, only a few scoring procedures are endowed with their axiomatic characterizations. At the same time, a large number of ingenious procedures are advocated and used in such disciplines as management science, operations research, psychometrics, applied statistics, processing of sport tournaments, graph theory, etc. Very few social choice papers deal with them. The aim of this paper is to take one circumspect step toward an axiomatic framework for comparing the merits of these elaborate procedures. As a result, we would like to isolate a family of scoring procedures that comprises a majority of 'reasonable' procedures (so that the further axioms could be imposed on this family). Two main approaches are applicable. The first one is to express the desired properties axiomatically, the second is to gather the existing procedures and specify their common algebraic form. We use both, and their results are concordant: A scoring procedure satisfies the axiom of self-consistency if and only if it has a monotone implicit form.
To circumscribe the variety of axioms that have already been used in the literature (and which can be adapted for the family of procedures isolated here), we survey a number of characterizations of scoring methods.
The paper is organized as follows. After the main notation (Section 2), we give a review of some papers that characterize scoring methods for preference aggregation (Section 3), introduce the notions of self-consistency (Section 4) and monotone implicit form (Section 5), and prove our theorem (Section 6).
Main notation
Let A = (A (1) , . . . , A (m) ) be a profile of individual preferences over the set of alternatives X = {1, . . . , n}. Here m is the number of individuals and A (p) , p = 1, . . . , m, represents the preferences of the pth individual. In classical papers, A (p) are linear orders. Here we would like to involve several other settings as well, where equivalencies are allowed or transitivity is not assumed or even degrees of preference are reported. Namely, A The constraint a p ij + a p ji = 1 may seem to be unduly restrictive, but we believe it is not. In this setting, a p ij and a p ji are not independent comparison outcomes, but rather two complementary evaluations of the same outcome. That is why their relation merely characterizes the method of evaluation. Monotone transformations take them to other popular types of data, e.g., exponential transformations ψ give ψ(a p ij ) · ψ(a p ji ) = const, which is typical of the analytical hierarchy framework. Yet, as was noticed by an anonymous referee, the theorem in Section 6 is adaptable for the case with mutually independent a p ij and a p ji too. Letting some restrictions on A (p) (or on A as a whole) be imposed, suppose A is the set of all admissible preference profiles with given n (the number of alternatives) and m (the number of individuals). In Sections 4-6, n and m are fixed. Let M = {1, . . . , m}, X i = {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n}, i = 1, . . . , n.
A scoring operator or scoring procedure is a function ϕ : A → R n , where ϕ (A) = (s 1 , . . . , s n ), s i being a score (or weight, etc.) assigned to alternative i. 'Scores' are often associated with total points, however, a number of papers consider scores as general weights as in this definition, see, e.g., [53, 23] . Let scoring methods be the generic term for scoring operators and procedures of ranking/choice based on them.
The review in the following section involves a number of results that deal with social utility (welfare) functions. There is no essential difference between them and the scores s i , however, we do not find it natural to give them a common designation. So, we hold s i for scores derived from paired comparisons and v(i) (or v(x), x ∈ X) for social utilities. Individual utilities will be denoted by v 1 (x), . . . , v m (x), x ∈ X.
Axiomatic characterizations of scoring methods
Some papers that characterize scoring methods are presented in Table 1 (Parts 1 to 6). They are ordered chronologically (up to years), and every column can be used to classify the results. Characterizations of scoring procedures that have the form of product are not included, since their theory is entirely parallel to that of additive procedures (see, e.g., [43, 38, 64, 5] ). We use six standard abbreviations: N for neutrality, A for anonymity, M for monotonicity, IIA and NIIA for Arrow's and Nash's independences of irrelevant alternatives, and P for the strong Pareto principle ('weak P' designates the weak Pareto principle).
Resulting preference structures
Let us start with the third column. The scores of alternatives can be used in themselves, for ranking or choice. So the results are classified as ones characterizing:
• Ranking procedures based on scores. They may provide:
-Weak order [40, 61, 31, 62, 42, 79, 30, 2, 58, 27, 86, 71, 70, 67, 49, 85, 8, 55 ].
-Weak order over all admissible or feasible vectors of individual utilities/scores or on an extension of X [43, 7] .
-Partial order [30, 10] .
• Choice procedures based on scores (alternatives with the highest score are chosen). Table 1 contains procedures that provide:
-Choice set [83, 84, 45, 35, 69, 29, 63, 85, 72, 66] .
-Several variants of choice set with k members [24] . (It is interesting to compare Debord's result with another approach to the committee selection advocated and characterized in [11] and also based on the Borda scores.)
-Choice from a set of admissible or feasible vectors of individual utilities/scores or from an extension of X [65, 64] .
-Choice function that attaches a nonempty choice set to every subset of X [34, 49, 3, 9, 28] .
• Procedures resulting in scores, measures of social welfare, utility, etc., possibly on an extended set of alternatives [46, 51, 4, 12, 6, 15, 56] . 
1 Nonnegative scores that sum to 1 (distributions over X) 2 The scores are normalized so as to make up a distribution over X 3 A set V ⊂ R m is comprehensive iff x ∈ V and y ≤ x (this means y p ≤ x p for every p = 1, . . . , m) together imply that y ∈ V 
Input preferences
The form of input information also varies:
• Typically, it is a profile of classical individual preferences:
-Linear orders [42, 79, 83, 84, 45, 86, 69, 29, 72 ].
-Weak orders [40, 31, 62, 42, 30, 63, 28] .
-Individuals' scores, points, marks, cardinal utilities [43, 7, 61, 46, 51, 2, 58, 27, 70, 65, 64] .
-Choice sets [35] .
• The preferences in the profile may have more general forms:
-Partial orders [34] .
-Tournaments [67] .
-Arbitrary binary relations [24] (see also footnote 5).
-Valued (fuzzy) relations [55, 56] (see footnote 6).
-Incomplete skew-symmetric matrices of paired comparisons (in other words, skew-symmetric valued relations with incomparability distinguished from zero values) [12, 15] .
-Choice functions [3] .
-Arbitrary individual ballots [66] .
• In some papers, the initial preferences are represented by a single relation (which may be thought of as a majority relation or other function of the individual profile):
-Connected relation [49] .
-Valued relation [8, 9, 10] .
-Skew-symmetric matrix of paired comparisons [6] .
• Young [85] aggregates a series of paired comparisons without ties, where every alternative is involved in the same number of comparisons.
The most important axioms
Many of the following axioms are applied in slightly varying versions in different papers. Therefore we prefer to give their main ideas rather than exact formulations. Some axioms are renamed for the sake of unification.
Variable electorate axioms. Reinforcement for choice procedures states that if A and A ′ are disjoint preference profiles, A + A ′ is the combined profile and C(A) is the choice set for A, then
The same condition expresses reinforcement for procedures that generate a number of orders; here C(A) denotes the set of these orders. For ranking procedures, reinforcement states that if i is socially no worse than j for both A and A ′ , then this is the case for A + A ′ (with strict social preference for A or A ′ implying strictness for A + A ′ ). Reinforcement for scoring procedures means that every alternative's score for A + A ′ is the sum of its scores for A and A ′ , i.e., it reduces to a kind of additivity. Obviously, this axiom coincides with the following one if they both are applied to matrices of summarized paired comparisons.
Additivity for scoring procedures that operate on paired comparison matrices means that the sum of two matrices is mapped to the sum of score vectors derived from these matrices.
The following two axioms are 'dual' to reinforcement. Elimination says that if i is socially no worse than j for A + A ′ and i is socially equivalent to j for A, then i is socially no worse than j for A ′ . Strong elimination says that if i is socially no worse than j for A + A ′ and j is socially no worse than i for A, then i is socially no worse than j for A ′ . Overwhelming majority for choice procedures states that whenever C(A) = {i}, then for any A ′ there is an integer k
Here k A is the profile consisting of k copies of A. Overwhelming majority for ranking procedures results if we replace choice by social binary preferences.
Contraction, in the case of procedures that produce weak orders, says that the social ordering for A coincides with that for k A.
Disjoint equality says that if there are only two individuals, their individual choice sets X 1 and X 2 are nonempty (which is not generally assumed), and
is exactly the social choice. This axiom is important for characterizing approval voting [35] . Another related axiomatization is given in [36] .
Faithfulness states that in the case of only one individual having a linear order, her top ranked alternative/alternatives constitute the social choice/k-choice (respectively, individual's weak order is taken as the social one or is concordant with the social scores).
This natural condition is a variable electorate axiom of positive relation between individual and social preferences. Other axioms of this kind follow.
Axioms of positive relation between individual and social preferences. Monotonicity ('M' in Table 1 ) says that if some alternative becomes more favorite in one individual opinion, whereas all other alternatives get no rise, then it does not become worse in the social preference. Slightly varying formulations of strong monotonicity ('strong M' in Table 1 ) additionally require that this alternative leave behind the alternatives that were socially indifferent to it.
The following axiom restricts the positive response of the social preference. Suppose that some individual p only changes x ≺ p y to x ∼ p y or x ∼ p y to x ≻ p y and others change nothing. Stability applies to the procedures that transform profiles of weak orders to social weak orders and says that in no above situation the social weak order can change x ≺ z to x ≻ z with any z = y.
Pareto indifference says that everyone being indifferent between two alternatives implies social indifference between them.
Pareto preference says that if no individual strictly prefers j to i and at least one strictly prefers i to j, then i is strictly socially preferred to j.
Nonstrict Pareto preference says that if no individual prefers j to i, then the society cannot strictly prefer j to i. Table 1 ) is the conjunction of Pareto indifference and Pareto preference.
Strong Pareto principle ('P' in
Weak Pareto principle says that if all individuals strictly prefer i to j then so does the society.
To introduce the following axiom, suppose is a weak order on the set of alternatives X and ∼ is its indifference part. We say that a subset of alternatives X 1 ⊆ X is superior (equivalent) to X 2 ⊆ X w.r.t. iff cardX 1 = cardX 2 and there exists a one-to-one correspondence ω from X 1 onto X 2 such that ω(i 1 ) = i 2 implies i 1 i 2 (resp., i 1 ∼ i 2 ). Strict superiority means superiority and not equivalence. Pareto principle for equicardinal subsets says that whenever X 1 is superior to X 2 w.r.t. every individual's weak order, then X 2 cannot be strictly superior to X 1 w.r.t. the social weak order. If, in addition, X 1 is not equivalent to X 2 w.r.t. at least one individual weak order, then X 2 cannot be equivalent to X 1 w.r.t. the social weak order.
Weak unanimity for choice procedures says that whenever all individual paired comparisons favor alternative i, then {i} is the social choice set. Weak unanimity for ranking procedures says that whenever all individual paired comparisons agree with a fixed linear order, then it is taken as the social one.
Closeness to unanimity essentially specifies a concrete voting procedure which follows. Let U (i) be the set of all profiles where i is the top alternative in all constituent linear orders. For a given profile A, those alternatives i are chosen which minimize the inversion distance between A and U (i). As usual, this distance is defined as that between A and the nearest member of U (i) and equals the number of differently ordered pairs of alternatives. Table 1 presents only one characterization [29] based on resolving optimization problems. In fact, these are numerous. One of the most interesting results of this nature is as follows.
The Borda method can be characterized [80] as the point method which maximizes (among all point methods) the proportion of profiles for which the social preferences agree with those of the majority vote (viz., with the majority winner on a pair of alternatives, or with the Condorcet winner, or with the Condorcet ordering, provided that the latter two exist). A related characterization of the Borda choice function was obtained by Fishburn and Gehrlein [39] . Some other characterizations involving optimization are dealt with in [19, 13, 14, 18] ; [13] also describes some statistical procedures resulting in Borda-like scores.
Permutation-independence and substitution-independence axioms. Anonymity and neutrality essentially say that no information about individuals and alternatives (respectively) except for the preference profile is used to derive the social preferences. More formally, they require the social preference operator to be stable to any permutation of individuals and commutative with any permutation of alternatives.
Suppose that there exist a permutation of individuals and a permutation of alternatives such that their simultaneous application leaves the preference profile invariant. Symmetry states that the corresponding alternatives must be socially equivalent in this case.
Symmetry is very effective as applied to the voting situations like the Condorcet paradox. On the relationship between anonymity, neutrality and symmetry see [30, pp. 473-474] .
Independence of symmetric substitutions says: If profile A ′ is obtained from A by a one-element swap between C p (X ′ ) and C q (X ′ ) (individual choices of p and q from feasible set X ′ ⊆ X), then the social choice from X ′ must be the same for A and A ′ .
Individual-independence axioms. Independence of locally unaffected individuals [40] states that if some individual is indifferent between two alternatives, then his/her other preferences do not influence the social preference between these two alternatives.
Independence of generally unconcerned individuals says that if some individual assigns the same score (utility) to all alternatives, then the social ordering is not affected by this particular score. This corresponds to Debreu's [26] strong separability condition which is crucial for his derivation of the additive utility representation.
Independence of locally unaffected individuals plays a similar role in Fleming's derivation of monotone summability.
Suppose that only one individual changes his/her preference relation. Separability of individual influences applies to scoring procedures and says that the resulting differences of the scores of alternatives solely depend on that individual's previous and new preferences and are indifferent to the other individuals' preferences.
Alternative-independence axioms. Arrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives ('IIA' in Table 1 ) says that the application of the social preference to any subset of the set of alternatives solely depends on the restriction of the individual profile to this subset.
Strengthened IIA says that after the removal of any alternative, the social preference coincides with the initial one applied to the subset of remaining alternatives, provided that the individual preferences do not change.
As distinct from IIA, strengthened IIA implies that the set (and the number) of alternatives may vary.
Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (NIIA in Table 1 ) says that whenever X ′ and X ′′ ⊂ X ′ are two sets of alternatives such that X ′′ contains some alternatives chosen from X ′ , then exactly these alternatives constitute the choice from X ′′ . Nash applied this condition to one-element choice, and the more general above formulation is due to Arrow.
Note that IIA is met by (and enters characterizations of) most scoring methods that operate on individual utilities but is not satisfied by many scoring methods dealing with binary relations (including valued relations). This is due to the very relative nature of binary relations which causes some loss of information involving a subset of alternatives as a profile is restricted to the subset. The following observation clarifies the point. Consider the restrictions of an individual profile to two complementary subsets of alternatives. Then the initial profile can be retrieved from these two restrictions provided that it consists of utilities and cannot be if it comprises binary relations. From this point, the variable electorate axioms are more appropriate in the case of binary relations, since no information is lost when the profile is divided into parts corresponding to disjoint sets of individuals. The same can be said of the profiles that consist of choice functions.
The record 'a relaxed IIA' stands for various relaxations of IIA. The following two axioms combine relaxed IIA with a positive relation to social preferences.
Independence of Pareto dominated alternatives says that removing Pareto dominated alternatives does not alter the social choice.
Independence of the Pareto inferior alternative states the same concerning the alternative that is Pareto dominated by every other one.
Independence of extreme alternatives is a close condition which, unlike the previous two axioms, does not imply any 'positive relation to social preferences'. It says that unanimously superior as well as unanimously inferior subsets of alternatives can be discarded without changing the order on the remaining alternatives.
The following axiom embodies a similar idea applied to one individual's preferences. Suppose that some individual ranks alternative z ahead both x and y or behind both x and y, and then moves z to another position which is also not between x and y and not the same with x or y. Strong positional independence for the profiles of weak orders [42] says that such a shift does not change the social relation between x and y.
Dissolution [30] introduces acceptable dissolution procedures (we do not specify them here) for breaking ties in the individual profiles of weak orders and says that the social binary relation for a given profile must contain the common part of social binary relations derived for all acceptable dissolutions of the profile.
A similar idea has been exploited in [62] . Young and Levenglick [86] use a peculiar axiom which combines independence and positive reaction. In Table 1 it reads as 'the order of immediately successive alternatives obeys majority vote'. This regards every two alternatives immediately successive in one of the derived social linear orders.
Independence axioms involving preference relativity. Independence of the individual zeros (of utility) requires that the social ordering over X remain unchanged when each individual's utility function v p (x), x ∈ X, p = 1, . . . , m is replaced by v Independence of the common zero and independence of the common unit (of utility) respectively mean the invariance of the social ordering with respect to arbitrary transformations v
Independence of cycles states that the choice set (respectively, the resulting ordering) does not alter whenever any cycle in any input preference relation is reversed. Independence of circuits and independence of alternated cycles are variations of this axiom.
The following condition is closely related to independence axioms. In the case of ordinary binary relations it can be termed 'majority equivalence', whereas in the case of valued relations it bears the spirit of additivity.
Cancellation for procedures that operate on profiles of binary preferences states that if for every i and j, sum of the entries of the relations on (i, j) is equal to that on (j, i), then all alternatives are socially equivalent. For ordinary binary relations, 'sum of the relations on (i, j)' reduces to the number of individuals that prefer i to j.
Other profile transformation axioms. Note that monotonicity and independence conditions are profile transformation axioms. Here we present such transformation conditions that bear neither positive response nor independence.
Duality states that the reversal of all individual preference relations cannot preserve any formerly chosen alternative in the social choice set, unless the initial social choice set coincides with X.
Inversion says that the social weak order derived after the above transformation is the reversed initial one.
Suppose that the alternatives are identified with the vectors of individual utilities attached to them. Then every set in R m can be considered as a set of alternatives. Let ϕ be a social choice procedure which indicates one 'best' alternative (point in R m ) in each set that belongs to its domain.
Linearity with respect to sets means that for every
′′ is the set of all expected utility allocations which are now feasible. Thus, linearity w.r.t. sets says that the today's chosen utility allocation should be equal to the expectation of the tomorrow's allocation.
Additivity with respect to sets is a close property saying that for any admissible V
. Commutativity with translations reads as the application of additivity w.r.t. sets when one of the sets is a singleton: ϕ (V + {v}) = ϕ (V ) + v for all admissible V and all v ∈ R m .
Expected utility axioms. As Myerson [65] demonstrated and as we saw above, linearity with respect to sets has a natural interpretation in terms of expected utility.
In general, if an aggregation procedure takes each profile of expected utility functions to an expected utility function, the linearity of this procedure follows under rather weak conditions (namely, von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms and Pareto indifference are sufficient). Harsanyi [46] was the first to show this (see also [68, 51, 37] ). An excellent philosophical justification of the underlying model is given in [47, 48] . The entire book [77] is very valuable for the comprehension of utilitarianism.
The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility axioms [81] can be summarized (in the form of Marschak postulates [57] ) as follows. The relation of preference is a weak order ( ) defined on a set of alternatives (prospects); this set is closed w.r.t. taking lotteries (probabilistic mixtures) of its members; there are at least four mutually nonindifferent prospects; if x y z then there exists a mixture of x and z such as to be exactly indifferent to y; if x and x ′ are indifferent, then, for any prospect y, any mixture of x and y is indifferent to the mixture of x ′ and y with the same probabilities. The Expected utility assumption of [51] states that both the individual scores of alternatives and the social scores are expected utilities subject to the same underlying probabilistic model. Essentially, this means that the feasible alternatives are lotteries over certain outcomes.
In fact, Harsanyi's theorem (as well as more recent Keeney's theorem [51] and the result in [37] ) can be considered as a realization of the program outlined by Fleming [40, p. 380] on translating his own result into the expected utility framework. On the connections between these two results see [41] .
Strategy-proofness means in [4] that if the social scores (properly normalized) are considered as the probabilities of the alternatives in a lottery, and each individual has a cardinal utility function that induces her personal ordering, then no individual can increase her expected utility in the resulting lottery by misrepresenting her true ordering.
Other axioms. Suppose that the individual profile consists of utility functions v 1 (i) , . . . , v m (i)) is a utility mapping, V is the set of admissible utility mappings, and ϕ is a procedure that takes each v ∈ V to an ordering R over X.
Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) ∈ R m . Suppose R + (x) is the set of y = (y 1 , . . . , y m ) ∈ R m such that for some admissible utility mapping v ∈ V , (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and (y 1 , . . . , y m ) are the vectors of individual utilities of some alternatives i ∈ X and j ∈ X, respectively, and iRj, where R = ϕ (v). The set R − (x) is defined by replacing 'iRj' with 'jRi' in the definition of R + (x). Continuity states that the sets R + (x) and R − (x) are closed for all x ∈ R m . It follows from Debreu's teorem [25] that this axiom implies the representability of ϕ by a continuous function of v 1 (i), . . . , v m (i).
Roberts [70] exploits another condition, weak continuity, which says that for every admissible utility mapping v = (v 1 (i) , . . . , v m (i)), there exists an admissible utility mapping 
Summability of a ranking (choice) procedure means that the social order (choice) is determined by a summable scoring procedure. This condition is the crucial axiom in [42] and simultaneously is closely related to the procedures characterized in [40, 31, 58] and point ranking procedures characterized in [79, 30, 84, 4] and generalized in [66] .
The idea of 'minimal equity' is that the social ranking procedure is not always based on the most optimistic estimates of alternatives (in other terms, on the preferences of the best off individual). Specifically, suppose i, j ∈ X and there exists p ∈ M such that v p (j) > v p (i) whereas for all other q ∈ M , v q (j) < v q (i) < v p (i). Minimal equity says that the social ranking procedure is not one always preferring j in such situations.
Thus, the characterization results rest upon:
• Reinforcement or elimination (sometimes supplemented by overwhelming majority) [ • Pareto principle for equicardinal subsets [31, 34] .
• Closeness to unanimity [29] .
• Independence of cycles and its variations [49, 8, 9, 10] .
• Independence of locally unaffected individuals [40] .
• Relaxations of IIA [71, 49] . Sometimes these conditions combine with summability [42] , elimination [30] , reinforcement [86, 69, 85] and its weak version [62] .
• Additivity [6] , additivity w.r.t. sets [64] , linearity w.r.t. sets [65] , commutativity with translations [64] .
• IIA applied to utility functions along with scale invariance conditions [43, 7, 61, 2, 58, 27, 70] . In a discrete context, this approach is applied in [43, 28] .
• Expected utility axioms [46, 51, 37] .
• An expected utility version of strategy-proofness [4] .
• Among other axioms we mention -Axioms of positive relation between individual and social preferences (Pareto principle, monotonicity, independence of Pareto dominated/ Pareto inferior alternatives, weak unanimity, faithfulness) which occur in almost all characterizations.
-independence of generally unconcerned individuals [58, 27, 70] which, as well as independence of locally unaffected individuals and Pareto indifference (to some extent), can help separate individual variables.
-Cancellation [83, 67, 24, 55, 56] .
-Disjoint equality [35] .
-Independence of symmetric substitutions [3] .
-Symmetry, contraction, dissolution [30] .
-Inversion [30] and duality [63] .
-Summability and stability [42] .
-Continuity [58] and weak continuity [70] .
-Minimal equity [27] .
-Implicit form of scores [12, 15] whose generalization will be discussed in Section 5.
Resulting methods
The last column of Table 1 requires some definitions. We represent individual binary relations (both ordinary and valued ones) by matrices of paired comparisons A (p) = (a p ij ), p = 1, . . . , n. When the input preference relation is single, one matrix A = (a ij ) can be substituted for A (p) . As distinct from all other sections of this paper, now we do not assume a First, we introduce a rather general form of scores used in the methods of Table 1 . Extended Borda scores are defined as follows:
The idea of summing differences (a p ij − a p ji ) is due to Copeland [20] (see also [54] ), but conventionally his name is only attributed to such scores derived from a single relation, particularly from that of simple majority. We follow this tradition.
Extended Borda ordering and extended Borda choice designate in Table 1 various instances of ranking and choice induced by the extended Borda scores, provided that they have no proper name. Specifically, Borda choice and Borda ordering are the instances where the individual profile consists of linear orders. When a choice function is concerned, the Borda (or Copeland) choice may have absolute ('broad') or relative ('narrow') form [75] , depending on whether the score is counted over the whole set of alternatives or over its presented subset.
The scores
are referred to as down-sided and up-sided Borda scores, respectively. For profiles of linear orders, they are equivalent to the extended Borda scores up to a positive affine transformation. In this case, the term 'Borda score' is used. Factored Borda scores are also equivalent to the extended Borda scores on all profiles of linear orders. In the case of weak orders, they are defined as follows:
where
is the strict preference of the pth individual. The properties of these and some other extensions of the Borda scores to the profiles of weak orders are studied in [42] .
Suppose that the preference profile consists of individuals' choice sets. Note that they can be represented by weak orders with exactly two 'strata' (classes of equivalent alternatives). In this case, the factored Borda scores are approval voting scores. They equal the numbers of supporting individuals.
For profiles consisting of linear orders, down-sided Borda scores are generalized in two ways. The scores
with α(·) nonnegative and nondecreasing 7 real-valued function, are point scores. Function α(·) defines the 'points' assigned to an alternative i for each position in individual orders. If each position except for the highest one is assigned a zero point, then plurality scores result. Transfinite point ordering allows transfinite 'points' which need not satisfy the Archimedian property. Composite point ordering results when one has several different vectors of point scores (determined by different α's) and applies them successively, for breaking ties that survived. In fact, transfinite point orderings and composite point orderings give rise to the same family of aggregation operators (see [79] ). At composite point choice, the point scores are used to refine the choice. As distinct from the point ordering, ranking by the sum of arbitrary scores (utilities) that represent individual orders is generally neither anonymous nor neutral. A utility function v : X → R represents a weak order on X iff ∀i, j ∈ X, i j ⇔ v(i) ≥ v(j). The scores
with β(·) nonnegative and nondecreasing real-valued function, are lobby size scores (supporting size scores in [4] ). Function β(·) defines the partial scores assigned to i for each size of a 'lobby' (coalition) supporting i against j. This is another generalization of down-sided Borda scores.
The most general Borda-like scores for profiles of linear orders are provided by convex combinations of point scores and lobby size scores:
where 0 ≤ ν ≤ 1. The same approach can be applied to the extended Borda scores as well.
Partial ordering of permuted dominance is an interesting procedure introduced in [30] as follows. Alternative i nonstrictly dominates j iff there exists a permutation σ of individuals and, for each individual p, permutations σ p of alternatives such that for
. This definition is not perfectly constructive, and the authors give an algorithm for obtaining this partial ordering, characterize it (see Table 1 ) and thoroughly study its properties. The partial ordering of permuted dominance is not generated by any scoring procedure but it is the intersection of all point orderings. We present it here mainly because its definition is related to our self-consistency axiom (Section 4).
Generalized row sums make up a parametric family of scores that coincide with the extended Borda scores on complete preference structures and generally satisfy specific systems of linear equations.
Finally, Kemeny median consists of all social orderings that are nearest to the individual preferences in the metrics 'sum of absolute differences at all pairs of alternatives'. This ranking procedure is not based on scores, and we included it because its characterizations are closely related to those of scoring methods. As Young [85] revealed, this median approach had been initially proposed in a vague form by Condorcet.
Thus, the last column of Table 1 induces the following classification of the axiomatic characterizations. The scoring, ranking and choice procedures in Table 1 are based on:
• Various manifestations of the extended Borda scores [62, 42, 30, 83, 45, 29, 4, 71, 67, 49, 85, 72, 6, 24, 8, 9, 55, 56] .
• Generalized row sums [12, 15] .
• Down-sided, up-sided and factored Borda scores for profiles of weak orders and valued relations:
-Down-sided Borda scores [28] .
-Meet of down-sided and up-sided Borda orderings [10] .
-Factored Borda scores [62, 63] ; scores of approval voting [35, 36, 3] .
• Point scores and lobby size scores:
-Point scores [79, 30, 84, 4] ; plurality scores [69, 63] .
-Partial ordering of permuted dominance [30] .
-Composite point scores [79, 84] .
-Transfinite point scores [30] .
-Lobby size scores [4] .
-Convex combinations of point scores and lobby size scores [4] .
• Sum of arbitrary scores (utilities) that represent individual orders [40, 31, 34] .
• Aggregation functions for individual utilities
-Utilitarian function -Homothetic and increasing functions W (v 1 (x) ,...,v m (x)) and special cases with homogeneous of degree 1 functions [70] , see also [82, 52] .
-Increasing and/or continuous or arbitrary functions W (v 1 (x) ,...,v m (x)) [43, 58, 70] .
• Sum of arbitrary scores determined by individuals' ballots [66] .
• Kemeny median [86, 85] .
Let us mention two other related families of procedures based on scores, first, the generalized positional voting methods by Saari [73, 74] . The choice is determined by point scores but in a more complicated (and still quite natural) way involving multiple comparisons of score differences and score sums with thresholds. Ordinary choice procedures based on scores are included. Saari characterizes this family, and the key axiom is weak reinforcement:
, where C(A) is the choice set. Merlin [60] demonstrates that a version of this axiom (and of a medium condition, inclusive reinforcement:
, where C(A) is the set of chosen linear orders, holds for a family of runoff ranking procedures based on scores. Here at each stage, some kind of point scores (for example, Borda scores or plurality scores) is counted for a restricted set of alternatives, i.e., for truncated preferences. The restriction of the set of alternatives is done by eliminating from consideration low scoring (or high scoring) alternatives which are thereby ordered. Characterizations of runoff choice procedures by Hare, Coombs and Nanson are given in [59] .
Types of preference aggregation procedures
An overall scheme of preference aggregation is depicted in Fig. 1 . Block 'C' is the main common feature of the scoring methods presented in Table 1 . Indeed, the very term 'scoring' means 'calculating some numerical indices of performance'. The methods vary in their starting point (A or B1 or B2), destination (C or D) and route between them.
Preferences of individuals
Individuals' utility functions derived from their preferences v p (x), p = 1, . . . , m, x ∈ X (or scores s 
Figure 1: An overall scheme of preference aggregation A→B1→C→D. This is a prevalent route [40, 31, 62, 79, 34, 30, 84, 35, 69, 63, 3, 66] . The most general result is that given by Myerson [66] where individual ballots are members of an arbitrary nonempty and finite set. They even need not be structures on the set of conceivable alternatives. For example, they may be some colors (red, rose, brown, green, etc.) representing various political orientations. Each ballot induces some scores of the available alternatives (these scores can be assigned by the planner); then the scores are summed up over individuals to give the ultimate scores of alternatives. Anonymity and some kind of neutrality are assumed.
Other highly general results are provided by Fleming [40] and Fishburn [31, 34] . Here, individual preferences are represented by binary relations, and the social preference structure is determined by the sums of arbitrary scores (utilities) that monotonically represent the individual relations. From the beginning, neither neutrality nor anonymity is imposed, but then Fishburn [34] studies the impact of these conditions in the framework of social choice functions.
Point scoring methods are the neutral and anonymous variant of such procedures. They have transfinite and composite extensions [79, 30, 84] .
In [62, 35, 69, 63, 3] specific scoring methods including plurality choice, approval voting and factored Borda method are characterized.
A→B→C→D. Definition (1) of extended Borda scores involves two sums which can be written in either order. Consequently, the corresponding scoring methods (as well as those based on down-sided or up-sided Borda scores) may take either A→B1→C→D or A→B2→C→D route. A→B→C→D is their common designation. Such scoring methods are characterized in [62, 42, 30, 83, 45, 29, 71, 67, 49, 85, 72, 6, 24, 8, 9, 10, 28, 55] . In some of these papers, the input preference structure is single binary relation (or weighted relation). It can be thought of as representing the preferences of a single individual (the corresponding scheme (A=B1)→(B2=C)→D results when 'B' is divided into 'B2' and 'B1' in A→B→C→D) or as an aggregate preference relation, e.g., majority relation. The latter route is B2→C→D, and the papers are [71, 49, 6, 8, 9, 10] .
B1→C→D. This route (A=B1 is usually implied) is typical of welfare economics and game theory. The procedures characterized in [43, 7, 61, 46, 2, 58, 27, 70, 65, 64, 82, 52] are listed in subsection 3.4. For other related results and a more general context we refer to [76, 1, 38, 64] .
A→B1→C, A→B2→C and A→B1,B2→C are represented by the characterizations of point scores, lobby size scores and their convex combinations in [4] . The generalized row sum method [12, 15] allows an A→B1,B2→C representation (as well as many other indirect scoring procedures; some of them-in versions suitable for complete preferences-are presented in Table 2 ).
A→B→C corresponds to the extended Borda scores [4, 56] .
A→C. This is for indirect scoring methods whose ultimate scores cannot be represented through B1 and B2 structures.
B1→C applies to [51] .
A→B2→D. Kemeny median characterized in [86, 85] does not need calculating any social scores ('C'). This method is presented in Table 1 since its characterization has much common with those of scoring methods.
B2→D
. We refer to the recent monograph [53] for a comprehensive study of such methods. The approach 'based on social binary comparisons of alternatives' is compared with the 'positional' approach in [32, 75, 42, 30, 74] .
The last issue we touch on in this section is: How do the presented characterizations of scoring methods that operate on individual orders and individual utilities help characterize indirect scoring procedures intended for arbitrary paired comparisons?
First, as [67, 85, 24] demonstrate, the classical Young's characterization of the Borda method can be adapted for arbitrary paired comparisons. The way of exploring further variations of the axioms involved seems very promising.
Further, note that the numerical paired comparisons have the same relation to individual utilities as two-valued paired comparisons do to individual orders. This clears the way of interpreting and adjusting the results of utility aggregation for the paired comparison context.
Another approach is suggested by Myerson's [66] result. In case we accept the conditions of Myerson's theorem, we have to admit that the aggregation of individual paired comparisons must be based on summing up some utilities derived from the ballots. Then the only problem remains to introduce proper individual scores that represent paired comparisons. The corresponding characterization problems seem to be less complicated than the initial ones.
It is worth mentioning, however, that no scoring procedure that operates on incomplete paired comparisons and satisfies self-consistency, neutrality and anonymity can be represented as A→B1→C [17] .
The procedures we characterize in the reminder of the paper operate on profiles of valued and ordinary binary relations and result in scores (A→C type). We use a unique axiom called self-consistency. It is introduced in the following section and belongs to the 'positive relation' group (its version applicable to ranking procedures was explored in [18] ). The scoring procedures that satisfy self-consistency are turned out to have a monotone implicit form (Sections 5, 6).
Self-consistency
If the scores generated by a scoring procedure are intended to serve as numerical estimates of the alternatives, they should be comparable. This means that whenever we consider i to 'perform better' than j, the score of i should be greater, whether they are taken from the same or from different profiles.
Let a scoring procedure ϕ be fixed, so the score vector (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is determined for every A ∈ A .
The idea of the following axiom is simple. If i got better comparison results than j and the opponents of i are assigned respectively higher score than those of j, then the score of i should be greater than the score of j. To formalize this requirement, we introduce some special notation. Recall that M = {1, . . . , m} and X i = {1, . . . , n} {i}, i = 1, . . . , n (Section 2).
Definition 1 (Performance multiset)
The multiset
corresponding to all comparison outcomes of i in A will be referred to as the performance multiset of i in A.
Let A and A ′ be two admissible profiles of individual preferences. Suppose U i and U ′ j are the performance multisets of i in A and j in A ′ , respectively.
Definition 2 (Majorization)
Alternative i in A majorizes j in A ′ if there exists a one-to-one mapping µ from U i onto
′ if, in addition, at least one of the above inequalities is strict for at least one comparison outcome a p ik .
Axiom 3 (Self-consistency)
It can be said that a scoring procedure is self-consistent when it preserves majorization. In other words, this axiom is a kind of Pareto condition with a self-consistent version of superiority which allows permutations and inter-profile juxtapositions. Among the axioms of the previous section, self-consistency is related with the Pareto principle for equicardinal subsets [31, 34] , permuted dominance [33] and especially with its version exploited in [30] . As distinct from them, self-consistency applies to A→C aggregation procedures, which enables it to capture interprofile comparisons. Besides, self-consistency is weaker in that it only recognizes the superiority in comparison outcomes confirmed by exceeding scores of the 'opponents'.
Self-consistency is illustrated in Fig. 2 where only comparison outcomes of i and j are shown.
, and s e ≥ s ′ f , then i in A strictly majorizes j in A ′ with the following µ:
Monotone implicit form
Now consider scoring procedures of different nature. They came from such disciplines as management science, psychometrics, applied statistics, processing of sport tournaments, graph theory, etc., and are based on the resolution of systems of algebraic equations. The number of equations is the number of alternatives and the form of them is presented for several procedures in Table 2 . Five of them were rediscovered for several times and with different motivations. In the first column we give only the earliest references we know, other ones can be found in [16, 17] . In Table 2 The common idea of these procedures is to process comparison outcomes taking into account the strength of competing alternatives which (strength) is estimated through their 'performance' in the same profile. In this sense, these methods are self-consistent. A relation to the axiom of the same name is conveyed by the following theorem.
It is easily seen that each equation in Table 2 has the form
where h(·, ·, ·) strictly increases in a p ij (recall that a p ij + a p ji = 1, j = i, p = 1, . . . , m, as assumed in Section 2) and in s j and strictly decreases in s i . These properties of h(·, ·, ·) can be intuitively motivated as follows: The greater comparison outcomes a p ij and 'strengths of opponents' s j alternative i has, the greater should be its own 'strength' s i (to provide the zero sum on the left-hand side).
A form close to (2) was used as an axiom to derive the generalized row sum method in [12, 15] . It can be noted however that this form is somewhat too special because of the double sum on the left-hand side. Let us replace this sum with an arbitrary strictly increasing function.
Let T be the set of all multisets that consist of m(n − 1) real triples.
Definition 4 (Monotone implicit form of scoring procedure) A scoring procedure ϕ : A → R n has a monotone implicit form if there exists a function g : T → R such that 
Smith [78] , Gulliksen [44] j =i
(i) for every profile A ∈ A , the scores satisfy the system of equations
(ii) g strictly increases in every a p ij and s j and strictly decreases in s i .
This form is a direct generalization of (2).
6 Self-consistency amounts to the existence of a monotone implicit form Theorem 5 A scoring procedure ϕ is self-consistent if and only if it has a monotone implicit form.
The 'if' part of the theorem is an easy consequence of the corresponding definitions (see the proof). The converse statement is not so trivial. Below it is reduced to the fact that every bounded function defined on any 'Paretian subset' of R k has a strictly monotonic extension to the R k (Lemma 6). In fact, we need a special case of Lemma 6, but its general formulation has essentially the same proof and is worth mentioning by itself.
Prior to proving Theorem 5, note that the extended Borda scores (1) trivially satisfy self-consistency (the proof is left to the reader). By Theorem 5, this procedure must have a monotone implicit form. Indeed, as shown in [12, 15] , a one-parametric family of such forms is provided by the generalized row sum method:
where ε > 0 is a positive parameter and γ = ε −1 +mn. The least squares procedure by Smith [78] and Gulliksen [44] presented in Table 2 provides another form which can be obtained from (4) as ε → ∞.
Proof
Let ϕ be a scoring procedure such that there exists g : T → R having the properties (i) and (ii) of monotone implicit form. Prove that ϕ is self-consistent. Suppose that i in A majorizes j in A ′ . Then there exists a one-to-one mapping µ
Then by (ii) the left-hand side of the ith equation of (3) written for A is greater than the left-hand side of the jth equation of (3) written for A ′ and they cannot be both equal to zero. Hence s i ≥ s ′ j and item 1 of self-consistency is satisfied. Item 2 is proved similarly. Now suppose that ϕ is self-consistent. Prove that there exists a function g : T → R satisfying (i) and (ii).
Let us say that a set P ⊂ R k , k ∈ N = {1, 2, . . .} is a Paretian subset of R k if for any (z, z ′ ) ∈ P 2 , either z = z ′ or there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that z i > z Let P ϕ ⊂ R t where t = 3m(n − 1) be the set of all vectors z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z t ) such that the multiset {(z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ), (z 4 , z 5 , z 6 ), . . . , (z t−2 , z t−1 , z t )} is the multiset of comparison triples of some alternative in some profile A ∈ A . It follows from self-consistency that P ϕ is a Paretian subset.
Lemma 6
Suppose P is a Paretian subset of R k , k ∈ N . For every bounded function f P (x) : P → R, there exists a function f (x) : R k → R such that ( * ) The restriction of f (x) to P coincides with f P (x) and ( * * ) f (x) is strictly increasing in every component of x: x 1 , . . . , x k .
Proof

Prove Lemma 6 for the open hypercube
9 L = x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ) |x i | < 1, i = 1, . . . , k substituted for the Euclidean space R k . After that the general case of R k will be reduced to this one. Introduce the following notation.
For any x, y ∈ L, x ≥ y means ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} x i ≥ y i .
For every x ∈ L, let Suppose e i is the unit vector of the ith axis of R k ; D = D(P ), U = U (P ). Suppose that F min , F max ∈ R are such that for any x ∈ P , F min ≤ f P (x) ≤ F max holds (recall that f P (x) in Lemma 6 is bounded). Define several auxiliary functions on L. For every x ∈ L define
and finally, f (x) = f 1 (x) + f 2 (x). Now we prove that f (x) possesses the desired properties ( * ) and ( * * ). First, note that d i (x) and u i (x), i = 1, . . . , n, and thus f (x) are well-defined by the definitions of D and U .
( * ) For any x ∈ P , f (x) = f P (x) since ∀ x ∈ P d i (x) = u i (x) = 0, and f 2 (x) = f P (x).
( * * ) Prove that f (x) is strictly increasing on L in every x i . It suffices to show that for any x ∈ L, α > 0, and i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
Fix i and prove three statements.
. Then x, x ′ ∈ L ∩ D ∩ U = P . This is impossible since P is Paretian. (C) f 2 (x ′ ) ≥ f 2 (x). It is easy to verify that all possible translations of the vector x + α e i ∈ L from one set to another as α ≥ 0 increases are specified by the following diagrams:
At all these translations, f 2 (x) does not decrease by definition.
By (A), (B) and (C), f (x) is strictly increasing in x i on L.
2. Now let P be any Paretian subset of R k . To extend f P (x) to R k , we first contract R k onto L by the mapping y = ψ(x) where y i = 2 π arctan x i , i = 1, . . . , k. Then solve the problem on L and finally extend L onto R k by y = ψ −1 (x), i.e., y i = tan( π 2 x i ), i = 1, . . . , k. It is obvious that under these strictly increasing transformations, Paretian subsets are mapped to Paretian subsets and strictly increasing functions to strictly increasing functions. This completes the proof of Lemma 6.
To prove Theorem 5, apply Lemma 6 to P = P ϕ . Namely, put R k = R t and f P ϕ ≡ 0. Then the conclusion of Lemma 6 differs from the desired statement only by that the required function g should be defined for the multisets of real triples and should map all multisets of comparison triples to zero, whereas function f provided by Lemma 6 is defined on R t and maps to zero all vectors corresponding to the multisets of comparison triples. But note that P ϕ is invariant (by definition) to any permutation of triples of adjacent coordinates (z 3r−2 , z 3r−1 , z 3r ). Then, by the proof of Lemma 6, in this case f is also invariant to such permutations applied to its argument. This implies that the value of f for any vector x ∈ R t is solely determined by the multiset of adjacent triples of coordinates x 1 , . . . , x t . In other words, f does not depend on the order of these triples in (x 1 , . . . , x t ). Therefore, f being considered as a function of such multisets of triples defines a function g with the desired properties. This completes the proof.
